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Double Heuristics and Collective
Knowledge: the Case of Expertise
Stephen Turner

There is a burgeoning literature on social epistemology. Some of it purports to
illuminate the problem of expert knowledge. Much of this literature applies
epistemological theories, such as reliabilism, to expert claims, which are
interpreted in terms of notions familiar to epistemology, such as testimony.
Another body of literature is concerned with the contrast between individual
and collective rationality or collective knowledge, and is concerned with issues
of emergence, specifically with the claim that collective knowledge processes
are different from and arrive at different and better results than individual
knowledge acquisition. Many of these are discussions of collective rationality,
and use formal methods. To do so, they typically simplify the issues by
assuming independent individual judges. Independence implies epistemic
independence, meaning that people act on their own knowledge. Discussions
of the related problem of expertise typically follow the same pattern: expertise
is compared to testimony, which the individual judges as reliable. The classic
prisoner’s dilemma is based explicitly on the mutual ignorance of the prisoners
with respect to intentions. Both the social relations between the prisoners and
the possibility of sharing knowledge are defined away. In this respect, these
approaches follow standard economic theories, which assume information
equality or otherwise assume the irrelevance of differences in quality of
information between market participants in market transactions. Nor is there
an easy alternative to these assumptions. Asymmetric information theorizing,
for example, is technically difficult even in small scale transactions with limited
dimensions of relevant information, such as theorizing the issues of agency in a
used car purchase. Expanding these considerations and expanding
considerations of variations between market participants makes calculating
outcomes intractable.
My concern in what follows will be with cases of extreme “information
asymmetry” in which members of the audience of the experts have knowledge
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that is different from the knowledge of experts. The knowledge is often
relevant, and the decision by a member of the audience of the expert to accept
or reject the expert’s claims is not, as the models imply, based simply on beliefs
about the reliability of the experts, but on the knowledge that the member of
the audience already has, and has solid grounds for. In these cases, the better
model for understanding how the member of the audience assesses the expert
involves the content of the knowledge, not merely the evaluation of the expert.
The member of the audience makes an epistemic judgment on the primary
knowledge material, not merely on the credentials of the expert. My concern in
this paper will be to provide a way of thinking about these epistemic
judgments. But this discussion will be mostly illustrative.
My primary aim will be to suggest a way of thinking about the
aggregation of these judgments and how this aggregation can be understood. In
the course of this I will treat the problem of expert knowledge as a special case
of knowledge aggregation. My suggestion will be that the application of specific
decision procedures, such as voting, produces, at the collective level, an
emergent form of knowledge acquisition with its own features. Nothing about
this account, however, requires an appeal to super-individual entities or
processes, collective intentionality, and so forth. My point, rather, will be that
to understand these processes it is necessary to eliminate some familiar
prejudices about knowledge acquisition and our dependence on others. To put
it in a slogan, my point is that “collective epistemology” or social epistemology
has failed to be either sufficiently social or sufficiently epistemological. My
approach will be to bring both back in, without resorting to appeals to
collective facts.

The Background
Social epistemologists have long been concerned with cases in which
collective decisions, through such means as judges voting on verdicts, differ
from individual judgments. Philip Pettit formulates two of the standard
assumptions of these cases as follows:
$
$

you are amongst many people who face a certain question;
you are all equally intelligent, equally informed, and equally impartial.
(2006a: 179)

In normal social situations, neither of Pettit’s assumptions holds, and in expert
situations the exact opposite is assumed: that people who know something you
don’t are more intelligent, and may have fewer biases. Moreover, they claim to
understand the question better than you do, a second-order claim with unusual
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epistemic properties: among other things, it undermines the usual ways of
judging the claims of others as one understands them.
Pettit interprets the epistemic issues which arise when one’s own opinion
differs from the majority opinion as a normative problem: when should one
defer to majority testimony and when should one not do so? To answer this, he
adds to his standard assumptions about equal knowledge and the like
$
$

you, however, differ from most others in the answer you give;
you are aware that these things [i.e. the full set of prior assumptions
about equal intelligence, knowledge, and impartiality] are true. (2006a:
179)

If we begin with the question of how we would ever know that the people you
are among “are all equally intelligent, equally informed, and equally impartial,”
we can see that these models are epistemically problematic. In this case, the
problem of expert knowledge is excluded by definition: expert knowledge is
precisely that case in which equality in intelligence, knowledge, and impartiality
are denied by both the expert claiming expertise and the member of the
expert’s audience assessing it. So any direct application of these assumptions to
the notion of expert knowledge will fail. They could apply only if the problem
of expert knowledge is reduced to the problem of assessing expert “testimony,”
so that the question of when to defer to an expert becomes a problem of when
to defer to majority opinion about the expert. As noted earlier, this way of
understanding assent to expert claims strips the knowledge claims themselves
of content, making the knowledge of the content possessed by the members of
the audience irrelevant.
Another approach to the problem of aggregation involves the suspicion
of systematic bias in the production of expert knowledge claims. Miriam
Solomon has in mind the idea that gender biases and the like distort theory
choice. Although this approach was originally motivated by feminist
considerations, it applies more generally. Solomon constructs this as a problem
of epistemic diversity, and, rather than dealing with expert authority, deals with
the problem of theory choice in the scientific community as a model for
epistemic decision-making generally. She suggests that what is needed is a
means of eliminating the effects of biases by balancing biases against one
another and demanding empirical support for all options (2006a: 37-8; cf.
2006b). This differs slightly from Pettit’s approach, by assuming that despite
being equally impartial, people have biases. But it also takes a valuable step in
epistemologizing the problem of aggregation. “Theory choice by a community”
is a collective procedure, although it is a theoretical construction of the
observer rather than something that scientists collectively perform, as in voting.
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And the term “biases” does provide some, very minimal, epistemic content to
the notion of epistemic diversity. But this is too small a step. The problem of
bias is dwarfed by a much bigger problem of epistemic diversity: that we know
different things and can understand different things.

Double Heuristics
The Pettit assumptions are simply false. The true, but difficult, situation
is this. We know something already, about experts and what makes them
acceptable, and also often about the content of their claims. Our knowledge is
not “equal” to that of others, or the same as others. We have our own
experiences and practical and sometimes theoretical knowledge that either fits
or fails to fit with the expert claims. The (descriptive rather than normative)
epistemological problem is to understand this kind of knowledge and to
understand how we rely on our knowledge of others—the social aspect—and
how we use our own knowledge to assimilate it to what others know.
The literature in social epistemology has been dominated by technical
solutions. But if one adds actual epistemology to the social, by considering how
we use the content of the knowledge of others as distinct from simply
accepting on trust, these solutions become unstable. A less technical, but more
usable way of conceptualizing the problem would be this: to think of our use of
the knowledge of others as governed by more or less standard heuristics, which
may go wrong in abnormal situations, and thus have biases. To discuss this
problem, however, one needs some sort of model. The image of the individual
knower I propose to work with is itself a simplification, as it must be. But it is a
simplification that allows for a discussion, however limited itself, of the general
problem of knowledge aggregation. The model is this: the individual is limited,
operates with complexity reducing epistemic strategies, arrives at knowledge,
and makes knowledge judgments. The individual knower, in short, uses
heuristics, which, like all heuristics, work in some situations and not others.
They have biases and blind spots. This is hardly an innovative idea, of course.
It is enshrined in the literature on empirical models of rational choice (Tversky
and Kahneman 1974, 1981).
The value of this starting point is this: it provides us with a model for
thinking of emergent and “collective” forms of the same thing. We can think of
decision procedures, such as democracies, and aggregation mechanisms without
collective decisions but with “collective” outcomes, such as markets, as
themselves being heuristics. We can think of procedures which function as if
they were decision procedures, such as market decisions that put firms into
bankruptcy, as heuristics as well. The market itself is not a heuristic, nor is a
rule like majority voting. But it is a procedure which makes selections. If a
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procedure is understood as made up of people operating with particular
heuristics that include heuristics about the knowledge of others and how to
assimilate it, plus some sort of analogue to a decision, these emergent processes
themselves can be understood to have normal situations in which they “work”
and others in which their “biases”—biases being the source of the efficiency
gained by heuristics—lead to bad results.
This notion of a “double heuristic” then allows us to conceptualize the
issues that arise with, for example, the (now commonplace) claim that liberal
democracy needs to be abolished to save the human race in the face of global
warming. We can ask what sort of alternative collective heuristic there is, such
as the heuristic of uncritical acceptance of the assertions of scientific experts,
and what the biases of this heuristic might be; which is to say, to ask what the
normal and abnormal situation is for this heuristic when it is understood as a
heuristic made up of the aggregation of the heuristics of people judging experts
with the biases of these heuristics, and of experts themselves making decisions
with their biases.
Nevertheless, the contrast between individual and collective results is an
important one, and can be generalized beyond voting examples. If we think of
individual and collective procedures of dealing with questions, one thing is
immediately obvious—collective “decisions,” whether it is “the market
decides,” voting, or counting up the guesses about beans at the county fair, all
happen differently than individual decisions. One makes up one’s mind about a
bean-count, and decides to submit the estimate. The collective act of adding up
the estimates and taking a mean takes place on a schedule. No “minds” are
made up. The market makes pricing decisions continuously—buyers make
them one at a time, sellers look at their stock and respond by changing prices.
The collective result is a theoretical construction from the actual prices that are
charged transaction by transaction. Juries deliberate and vote, in accordance
with protocols and admonitions. Jurors decide they are persuaded when they
reach an epistemic threshold of doubt that they individually determine by selfexamination, but the collective threshold is unanimity or some other rule.

Putting Epistemology Back In
The problem of experts in politics has epistemic content, but the content
is highly problematic. Both the literature in what Alvin Goldman calls “classical
social epistemology” and the literature of the Mertonian sociology of science
have focused on the authority of science. As I have noted, epistemologists, not
fond of the term “authority,” have construed the issue in terms of testimony.
This allows authority to be interpreted in traditional philosophical terms, in this
case in terms of reliability and therefore in terms of reliabilism, as an
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epistemology. Other social epistemologists have focused on cases in which
collective knowledge is “better” than individual knowledge, or at least different.
The model in these cases is guesses at the number of beans in a jar at a country
fair: the mean is closer to the correct number than the individual guesses.
What is striking about these cases is their tractability to formal reasoning.
One can put up a matrix of judges’ votes, for example, and show that the
collective result of the votes differs from individual votes (List and Pettit 2002).
What is also striking is their inattention to content. Guesses about beans have
little epistemic content. Moreover, one’s knowledge of the guesses of others is
irrelevant or assumed to be irrelevant.
But actual cases of judgments of expert opinions in political contexts are
far richer, in a number of ways. The citizen has a variety of epistemic resources,
including beliefs about the world, experiences, grounds for making judgments
about the sources of claims, and personal knowledge to bring to the making of
beliefs about the subject matter discussed by experts and of the experts
themselves.
The classic discussion of this is Brian Wynne’s paper “May the Sheep
Safely Graze?” (1996) that considered the case of nuclear power experts
making claims about the effect of radiation. The sheep owners to whom the
expert discussion was addressed were skeptical of the claims, based on their
knowledge of the actual grazing habits of the sheep. This is a case of two kinds
of knowledge fitting together. But the fitting together involved content, and the
product of the fitting together would alter what each side believed, rather than
merely combining independent estimates to create a third without altering at
least the epistemic weight of the beliefs of one side or the other.
Assuming content away, using the model of bias and similar devices,
does not help much with these cases. Empirically, content-free judgments
about expertise based on the pure kinds of assessments involved in testimony,
in the extremely abnormal and purified sense of testimony in which the
reliability of the witness is the only consideration, are nowhere to be found.
When people on a jury assess real testimony, they do so on the basis of their
prior knowledge and actual experience of the world, as lawyers know very well,
which is why they are careful to select juries that are as ignorant as possible
about the topics they are going to hear testimony on.

A Classic Model of Science as a Collective Heuristic
Philosophy of science provides some models for thinking about “fitting
together,” such as Michael Polanyi’s picture of science as a big jigsaw puzzle
into which we each fit our little pieces of knowledge. Polanyi provided more
than one, and the differences between his accounts are revealing with respect
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to the phenomenon of the relation between individual and collective heuristics.
In the essays collected in The Logic of Liberty, he describes the collective process
in terms of the
adjustment of each scientist’s activities to the results hitherto achieved
by others. In adjusting himself to the others each scientist acts
independently, yet by virtue of these several adjustments scientists keep
extending together with maximum efficiency the achievements of
science as a whole. At each step a scientist will select from the results
obtained by others those elements which he can use best for his own
task and will thus make the best contribution to science; opening thereby
the field for other scientists to make their optimum contribution in their
turn– and so on indefinitely. ([1951] 1980: 34-35)
This implies that what I am calling a heuristic—an efficient method for getting
“collective” knowledge results from individual contributions to a process of
aggregating knowledge.
The only way to get the job finished quickly would be to get as many
helpers as could conveniently work at one and the same set and let them
loose on it, each to follow his own initiative. Each helper would then
watch the situation as it was affected by the progress made by all the
others and would set himself new problems in accordance with the latest
outline of the completed part of the puzzle. The tasks undertaken by
each would closely dovetail into those performed by the others. And
consequently the joint efforts of all would form a closely organized
whole, even though each helper would follow entirely his own
independent judgment. ([1951] 1980: 35)
A collective process is defined by its decision procedure, which in these early
writings Polanyi described as a “twofold condition,” consisting of rapid
publicity plus acclamation, in which
. . . each suggested new step can be readily judged as to its correctness or
otherwise, and that each new step is rapidly brought to the notice of all
participants and taken into account by them when they make their own
next move. ([1951] 1980: 36)
Pure science, as distinct from applied science or technology, required this
heuristic, rather than others.
Polanyi was arguing against planned science, which represented a distinct
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heuristic or set of possible heuristics. On the surface, planning seemed to be
the perfect way to avoid waste in science and produce valuable results. A great
deal of thinking, and a social movement of Left-wing scientists in Britain,
promoted planning generally, and the planning of science specifically, in the
1930s, as part of a general enthusiasm for the idea of planning. Polanyi’s
argument against planning had to do with the problem of knowledge.
Put negatively, planning is simply impracticable, at least for the most
important problems in science: No committee of scientists, however
distinguished, could forecast the further progress of science except for
the routine extension of the existing system . . . the points at which the
existing system can be effectively amended reveal themselves only to the
individual investigator. And even he can discover only through a lifelong
concentration on one particular aspect of science a small number of
practicable and worthwhile problems. ([1951] 1980: 89)
The argument against planned science then depends on an argument about the
distribution of knowledge. Translated into our terms, the argument is this:
knowledge in science is specialized, so a heuristic that depends on the
knowledge of some small group or any collective decision-making process will
lose the advantages that the specialist has in deciding how to pursue his or her
own problems.
But science cannot avoid collective decision procedures. Money has to
be doled out. In this respect it is necessary to construct another decision
procedure. Here, notoriously, Polanyi and his sympathizers found the going
more difficult. The process of doling out determines the content of the science
that can be extended. So there is no escaping the consequences of the system
of supporting science. The best that can be done is to have a system that
retains the advantages of the heuristic described above.
The pursuit of science can be organized . . . in no other manner than by
granting complete independence to all mature scientists. They will then
distribute themselves over the whole field of possible discoveries, each
applying his own special ability to the task that appears most profitable
to him. Thus as many trails as possible will be covered, and science will
penetrate most rapidly in every direction towards that kind of hidden
knowledge which is unsuspected by all but its discoverer; the kind of
knowledge on which the progress of science truly depends. The function
of public authorities is not to plan research, but only to provide
opportunities for its pursuit. All that they have to do is provide facilities
for every good scientist to follow his own interests in science. ([1951]
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1980: 89-90)
With this general heuristic in mind, one can turn to problems of institutional
design. This is the model that the Howard Hughes Medical Institute applies by
giving six-year appointments on a principle of scientific promise with no
restrictions on what the scientist will choose to do. The American National
Science Foundation does this by evaluating proposals on merit by specialized
panels. In each case, of course, many choices need to be made, each of which
involves biases, biases which diminish the odds of science penetrating in some
of the directions where hidden knowledge can be revealed.
The epistemology involved here is still individualistic: the discoverer
seeks hidden knowledge individually. Verification is collective, by acclamation.
Both of these are of course caricatures of the actual practice of science. But
there is already a hint in these early writings of the problems of fitting
knowledge together, which Polanyi later makes more central, in the idea of
extension and the admission that specialization of a very extreme kind is
characteristic of scientists. What disqualifies these scientists from making the
kinds of general judgments about how science should be planned is this very
specialization, and this also disqualifies them for the role of acclaiming
scientific achievements. In some of his early writings, Polanyi spoke of the
decision-makers in science as a group analogous to Plato’s Guardians. But the
Guardians were, so to speak, possessors of the most general knowledge;
scientists, in contrast, are specialists. These were conflicts that he later resolved,
in his classic essay “The Republic of Science” (1962).
The resolution is of interest not only because of its explicit appeal to the
concept of spontaneous coordination, but because of the new kind of
knowledge relation he identified as the connecting link between the specialized
worlds of science. The new emphasis is especially relevant to “social
epistemology,” because Polanyi makes an explicit contrast between activities
which are “coordinated” and those that are not. The examples favored by Pettit
and Solomon are uncoordinated—the judges rendering verdicts, people
guessing locations of submarines or numbers of beans in a jar are independent
and take no account of the knowledge that others have. In science, Polanyi
says, the result of this would be as follows:
Each scientist would go on for a while developing problems derived
from the information initially available to all. But these problems would
soon be exhausted, and in the absence of further information about the
results achieved by others, new problems of any value would cease to
arise and scientific progress would come to a standstill. (1962: 54)
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This is enough to show that science is a coordinated activity, “and it also
reveals the principle of their coordination. This consists in the adjustment of
the efforts of each to the hitherto achieved results of the others. We may call
this a coordination by mutual adjustment of independent initiatives—of
initiatives which are coordinated because each takes into account all the other
initiatives operating within the same system” (1962: 54). The emphasis on
coordination is new. And one soon sees why, when he considers the analogue
to a decision procedure in science.
When he turns to the problem of explaining the way in which
coordination works, he reasons in terms of what I have called here double
heuristics. He introduces the image of the puzzle: “Imagine that we are given
the pieces of a very large jig-saw puzzle, and suppose that for some reason it is
important that our giant puzzle be put together in the shortest possible time”
(1962: 55). He gives three examples of increasingly effective methods of doing
this with a group of helpers. The first is independence, in which each person is
given a few pieces to fit together: “Suppose we share out the pieces of the jigsaw puzzle equally among the helpers and let each of them work on his lot
separately” (1962: 55). He remarks “it is easy to see that this method, which
would be quite appropriate to a number of women shelling peas, would be
totally ineffectual in this case, since few of the pieces allocated to one particular
assistant would be found to fit together” (1962: 55). The second would be to
supply each with copies of all the pieces, but still make them work
independently: “We could do a little better by providing duplicates of all the
pieces to each helper separately, and eventually somehow bring together their
several results” (1962: 55). Polanyi’s verdict is that “even by this method the
team would not much surpass the performance of a single individual at his
best” (1962: 55).
The best collective heuristic would be this, which Polanyi takes to be a
model of the coordination heuristic for science itself:
The only way the assistants can effectively cooperate and surpass by far
what any single one of them could do, is to let them work on putting the
puzzle together in sight of the others, so that every time a piece of it is
fitted in by one helper, all the others will immediately watch out for the
next step that becomes possible in consequence. Under this system, each
helper will act on his own initiative, by responding to the latest
achievements of the others, and the completion of their joint task will be
greatly accelerated. (1962: 55)
He goes on to note that “Such self-coordination of independent initiatives
leads to a joint result
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which is unpremeditated by any of those who bring it about. Their
coordination is guided as by an invisible hand towards the joint discovery of a
hidden system of things. Since its end-result is unknown, this kind of
cooperation can only advance stepwise, and the total performance will be the
best possible if each consecutive step is decided upon by the person most
competent to do so” (1962: 55). He expands the thought with this image: “We
may imagine this condition to be fulfilled for the fitting together of a jig-saw
puzzle if each helper watches out for any new opportunities arising along a
particular section of the hitherto completed patch of the puzzle, and also keeps
an eye on a particular lot of pieces, so as to fit them in wherever a chance
presents itself” (1962: 55). The “competence” in question is epistemic and
localized. The person knows more about this little patch. But in the later text
Polanyi admits that this has implications for the acceptance and evaluation of
science.
From the point of view of discovery, the argument is the same. The
result is a heuristic that is more effective than the others, at least with respect to
speed. “The effectiveness of a group of helpers will then exceed that of any
isolated member, to the extent to which some member of the group will always
discover a new chance for adding a piece to the puzzle more quickly than any
one isolated person could have done by himself” (1962: 55). The term invisible
hand invites comparison to markets, and Polanyi suggests that the comparison
is apt, but the conclusion should not be that science is a special case of
markets, but that “the coordinating functions of the market are but a special
case of coordination by mutual adjustment” (1962: 66). This notion of mutual
adjustment, however, is a new emphasis. The contrast to the market is this:
In the case of science, adjustment takes place by taking note of the
published results of other scientists; while in the case of the market,
mutual adjustment is mediated by a system of prices broadcasting
current exchange relations, which make supply meet demand. But the
system of prices ruling the market not only transmits information in the
light of which economic agents can mutually adjust their actions; it also
provides them with an incentive to exercise economy in terms of money.
(1962: 56)
The motivations in science differ: “by contrast, the scientist responding directly
to the intellectual situation created by the published results of other scientists is
motivated by current professional standards” (1962: 56). Current professional
standards, as we will see, play a special role. The choices about what lines of
inquiry to follow that the scientist makes in the face of these standards, Polanyi
admits, have an economic character. The scientist does not want to waste time
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on insoluble problems, or those which are too easy, or hypotheses that are
implausible from the standpoint of present professional knowledge. But
originality is prized by these professional standards.
The puzzle, from the point of view of the application of collective
heuristics, is in the decision procedure, meaning in this case understanding how
these standards are applied. As noted, Polanyi earlier seemed to rely on a kind
of general acclamation. Now he recognizes the conflict between specialization
and the idea that each scientist is omnicompetent to act as judge.
No single scientist has a sound understanding of more than a tiny
fraction of the total domain of science. How can an aggregate of such
specialists possibly form a joint opinion? How can they possibly exercise
jointly the delicate function of imposing a current scientific view about
the nature of things, and the current scientific valuation of proposed
contributions, even while encouraging an originality which would modify
this orthodoxy? (1962: 59)
The solution to this is of course to invoke a new collective heuristic, or what
Polanyi calls an “organizational principle.”
In seeking the answer to this question we shall discover yet another
organisational principle that is essential for the control of a multitude of
independent scientific initiatives. This principle is based on the fact that,
while scientists can admittedly exercise competent judgment only over a
small part of science, they can usually judge an area adjoining their own
special studies that is broad enough to include some fields on which
other scientists have specialised. We thus have a considerable degree of
overlapping between the areas over which a scientist can exercise a
sound, critical judgment. And, of course, each scientist who is a member
of a group of overlapping competences will also be a member of other
groups of the same kind, so that the whole of science will be covered by
chains and networks of overlapping neighbourhoods. Each link in these
chains and networks will establish agreement between the valuations
made by scientists overlooking the same overlapping fields, and so, from
one overlapping neighbourhood to the other, agreement will be
established on the valuation of scientific merit throughout all the
domains of science. (1962: 59)
Crudely, there are scientists in adjacent areas of science who know enough to
judge the work of the specialist, and this enforces consistency in the application
of professional standards.
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These relations of adjacency produce a network, which is the point at
which we can interpret this as a collective heuristic. Polanyi puts this in his own
terms:
This network is the seat of scientific opinion. Scientific opinion is an
opinion not held by any single human mind, but one which, split into
thousands of fragments, is held by a multitude of individuals, each of
whom endorses the other's opinion at second hand, by relying on the
consensual chains which link him to all the others through a sequence of
overlapping neighborhoods. (1962: 59-60)
But scientific opinion, even when it is distributed in this way (and Polanyi has
more to say about whose opinions count most) is still opinion, as Polanyi
always insisted. These procedures, and the collective heuristics system they
create through their operation, are not epistemic guarantors of truth.
In his earlier writings Polanyi discussed the corruption of scientific
opinion. In “The Republic of Science” he concedes that the system of control
by the application of professional standards can lead to bad results. But on a
collective level, it is, in our terms, the best heuristic.
scientific opinion may, of course, sometimes be mistaken, and as a result
unorthodox work of high originality and merit may be discouraged or
altogether suppressed for a time. But these risks have to be taken. Only
the discipline imposed by an effective scientific opinion can prevent the
adulteration of science by cranks and dabblers. In parts of the world
where no sound and authoritative scientific opinion is established
research stagnates for lack of stimulus, while unsound reputations grow
up based on commonplace achievements or mere empty boasts. Politics
and business play havoc with appointments and the granting of subsidies
for research; journals are made unreadable by including much trash.
(1962: 61)
However, “Though it is easy to find flaws in [the] operation [of the
organizational principles of this system], they yet remain the only principles by
which this vast domain of collective creativity can be effectively promoted and
coordinated” (1962: 61).
Evaluating these claims is not my concern here. This is an illustration of
the basic concept of double heuristics. But a few points need to be made.
Polanyi changes his ideas about the nature of the relations between areas of
science in “The Republic of Science” by emphasizing the way in which
specialists in adjacent areas evaluated new findings. He tells us little about their
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heuristics for doing so, though clearly his general ideas about professional
standards are of the kind that has local variations and applications. More can be
said.
The considerations Polanyi applies to science were also applied by him
to the economics of planning, and this opens a related domain of inquiry.
Peter Boettke argued in The Political Economy of Soviet Socialism that the idea of
central planning was applied in earnest only for the first decade after the
Russian Revolution (1990). What emerged in its place was a collection of
loosely related plans. The way the plans were collected and collated had little to
do with the idea of central planning in the contemporary economics literature.
The models of perfect knowledge that Oscar Lange (and even Frank Knight in
response to Lange) had discussed when they examined the theoretical
possibility of centralized socialist planning were completely unlike the actual
process. Yet well into the 1940s, planning continued to be discussed in these
theoretical terms, and the successes of the Soviet Union were taken to
vindicate, in some sense, the theoretical possibility of a kind of virtual
knowledge of demand. Polanyi himself pointed out that, although the planners
got their knowledge in ways other than the open market, they were ways that
were quite mundane. As David Prychitko notes,
Polanyi argued that, as opposed to the theoretical model, the Soviet
economy has been composed of numerous, conflicting planning
centers—a “polycentric” as opposed to “monocentric” order.
Coordination, to the extent that it occurred at all, took place not at the
center of the planning hierarchy, but at the lower levels, among the
individual enterprise managers who used their own discretionary
authority and engaged in black market exchanges. Though the quantity
and quality of outputs chosen and produced at the enterprise level
became aggregated into a so-called central plan, and indeed were later
published as a unified, centrally issued plan established by the directives
of GOSPLAN (the Soviet central planning bureau), in fact the
coordination of economic activities took place at the enterprise level, at
the bottom of the hierarchy. (Prychitko 2002: 154n8)
Managers engaged in black market operations knew what the values of goods
were, whether there was demand, and so forth (cf. Roberts 2005). These were
imperfect means, but nevertheless means subject to real world discipline in the
form of facts about prices. The managers used this information to plan their
own production, and the planners aggregated these plans and tinkered with
them. This was a system with its own epistemic biases, resulting in part from
the limited knowledge of the contributing players. It was far from the ideal
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rationalized central planning. Nevertheless, it was a system that aggregated
knowledge of diverse kinds into a collective result.
The most famous alternative to this form of centralized pseudo-planning
in the “Socialist” countries was the decentralized Yugoslavian system of worker
self-managed productive units, which operated with limited market
mechanisms for resources, and more or less open markets for the consumer
goods. As Prychitko showed in Marxism and Workers Self-management (1991),
these units, which purported to solve the problem of alienation by giving the
workers control of what happened to the products they made, transferred the
problems of planning and making market related decisions to the workers, or
rather to workers’ councils, which were supposed to be democratic,
participatory, and to produce a decentralized bottom up control of the
economy that eliminated the waste of financial speculation and advertising.
Democratic participation is a knowledge aggregation system. And
comparing the scheme of aggregation of knowledge of an ordinary hierarchical
firm to a democratically self-managed one, as Prychitko does, points out some
interesting differences in how knowledge is shared. The workers had a greater
propensity and incentive to share information about what was happening in
their part of the production process, for example. But the workers were not
especially willing to undertake the knowledge related tasks of aggregating this
knowledge, or taking responsibility for decisions, problems that would be
solved in an actual case of democratic rule by rewarding winners in political
competition. This points to a whole range of questions about how propensities
and abilities to use and share knowledge differ among organizations, and thus
to the epistemic problem of what sort of different kinds of learners different
organizations are, and what are the biases, efficiencies, and blind spots in the
different “collective” information processing and aggregating heuristics that
result from the way in which the organizations operate.

Bilateral Asymmetric Consilience
Fitting the pieces together is a metaphor, as is the term ‘network’.
Polanyi doesn’t inquire into the epistemology of fitting together. What is the
relevance of having the pieces fit, or having new knowledge in adjacent areas of
science? Certainly it has some bearing on our sense that we are on the right
track, that the previous steps leading up to the new knowledge were the correct
ones, and so forth. This model suggests consilience of induction as both a
ground for belief in “our piece” and the solution provided by the puzzle as a
whole, but also suggests a model of collective outcomes of epistemic
contributions that go beyond individual knowers. The “adjustments” which
Polanyi stressed are also adjustments in what people believe and the weight
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they give to beliefs.
Other examples can be used to reveal the problematic results of
interpretations of experiments which ignore the “social” cues on which we
ordinarily and necessarily rely in coming to beliefs. It is nevertheless awkward
to think epistemically about what fitting together might mean because the
traditions of epistemology are individualist. To help this along, let me give an
example of a non-individual epistemic notion. Here the (descriptive rather than
normative) epistemological problem is to understand this kind of knowledge
and to understand how we rely on our knowledge of others—the social
aspect—and how we use our own knowledge to assimilate it to what others
know.
Suppose that the doctor supplies a diagnosis that is based on your selfreported symptoms, but that also predicts symptoms that you did not report
because you did not think they were relevant, but can now recognize as part of
the syndrome. The situation is one of asymmetric knowledge, but also of
distributed knowledge: the patient knows something the doctor doesn’t as well
as the reverse. They are different kinds of knowledge: the doctor supplies the
means of fitting together without knowing in advance at least some fact that
turns out to fit. This is consilience in the original Whewell sense of correctly
predicting some novel fact that the theory was not constructed to account for
(Whewell 1858: 88-90). In this case, the doctor was accounting for the
symptoms that were presented.
This is different from reliabilism, also “social” and “epistemic” in a sense
independent of judging testimony, yet which still reflects acceptance of the
asymmetric knowledge of others. The basic thought is that the fact of
consilience itself adds to the epistemic weight of the facts considered
independently, in contrast to the aggregation and voting cases. The added
weight is not something done by judging the expertise of the source, though
this is part of the story. It is social because you don’t get the epistemic payoff,
namely consilience, without the social, in this case the acceptance as minimally
weighty of the fact and content of the beliefs of others, which are then
combined with one’s own for the payoff.
In contrast, assessing testimony adds no epistemic weight, content, or
predictive power to the original testimony—it is a subjective weighing of
something else’s epistemic weight (or “probative force” —you can pick your
favorite term). “Consilience” or what we might in this case call “Asymmetric
Bilateral Consilience,” is more than merely consistency with the diagnosis,
which is another, weaker sense, (which might be the case where a jury rejects
testimony based on their own knowledge of relevant facts that are not
consistent with the testimony, which we could call “Asymmetric Bilateral
Consistency”). But maybe we could do the world a favor and not call them
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anything fancy.
Like all heuristics, this one can go wrong, and typically “going wrong”
means applying them under circumstances that don’t work for reasons the user
does not know. The place that this heuristic most obviously can go wrong is
when the novel fact predicted by the expert is not as independent of the facts
known to the non-expert as one or the other might believe. This would occur,
for example, when both expert and non-expert are describing facts in
accordance with a common but unacknowledged ideology, as when the nonexpert reads an ideologically selective newspaper report and “discovers” that
this fits an expert “truth” that is generated in a hidden way by the same
ideology. The hypothesis of a hidden variable producing the facts, like the case
of assumptions of independence in statistics, is normally one that is beyond the
limits of the heuristic itself. And this raises questions about the way in which
the heuristics we employ in assessing and giving weight to other people’s
opinions, for example in the case of the problem described by Pettit of when to
defer to majority opinion, are themselves potentially compromised. The
heuristics are limited by our failure or inability to assess whether these opinions
are indeed the result of more or less independent judgments of others, or are
the product of a consensus produced artificially by some other means. This fits
with the many social psychological experiments on conformity of the 1950s, to
be discussed shortly, which showed how readily people would accept false
beliefs if a group of which they were a part affirmed them. If the subjects of
the experiments had known that there was a conspiracy by the members of the
group to affirm these beliefs, or even, that they were not independently arrived
at, they would have responded differently. In the case of the physician’s
diagnosis, the same point holds: if one’s descriptions of one’s own symptoms
are influenced by the same therapeutic ideology as the physician, the
independence of the two acts of description, one motivated from and derived
from the physicians diagnosis, the other from the private experience of the
patient, is an illusion.
Polanyi’s puzzle model of science depends on giving epistemic weight to
the beliefs of others, and “fitting” in some way with their beliefs. What is
fitting, in an epistemic sense? This strong kind of consilience is one example of
fitting. Collective rationality, extended mind, etc. models locate the knowing in
the collective knower. Polanyi’s model doesn’t do that: it relies on the notion of
networks. But it also allows for, and indeed forces us to begin, thinking about
the kinds of heuristics, both individual and (actually) collective rather than
merely social, that are in fact employed, and how they produce the double
heuristic pattern. Bilateral asymmetric consilience is a very strong source of
epistemic weight. But it too makes some assumptions about independence: the
scientific workers are supposed to be specialists working on their own little
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patch of science and thus uninfluenced by what is going on in the parts of the
network, or the puzzle, that they are not working on. And this is not the only
form of fitting: there can be heuristics that work using weaker heuristics, such
as deference to scientific authority as such and consciously fitting our
observations and beliefs to whatever appears as the consensus. But of course
these heuristics have their own weaknesses and biases.

Information Poverty and Consensus
As part of the training for American diplomats, they are shown a table of
cutlery, with dozens of implements. Why? So they know how to use the right
fork, and avoid a diplomatic gaffe. One could have expert knowledge of such
things, but most of us, in the face of the problem of how to use a fork, use the
simple heuristic “when in Rome, do as the Romans.” This is suggestive. Isn’t it
normally right to accept what others believe, or to give it great weight? Isn’t it a
significant problem for a believer in x that others reject x? Doesn’t this
produce a potentially large explanatory burden?
Heuristics work in normal situations. This one would work as well,
unless one were copying the wrong person. And here we have heuristics as
well: the Castilians who, according to the apparently false legend, started lisping
because King Phillip lisped were following a heuristic, and successive
generations followed them based on their own heuristic of talking like their
betters. Does this make sense as a normative rule? Of course not, in the sense
of an abstract approach to ethical truth. But this is misleading, as are a large
number of psychology experiments which come to mind in these cases.
Here are a few examples. Vance Packard, in the 1950s, gave the example
of an umbrella for sale in a department store. At a low price, the umbrella failed
to sell. The price was doubled, and it sold briskly. What is going on here
epistemically? The question of whether an umbrella is any good is not one that
we are ordinarily able to determine by looking at it. The heuristic that says “you
get what you pay for” would lead you to think a cheaply priced umbrella was
no good; a higher priced one would be good. Since this is the only information
we have in this case, the rule misleads us.
The Asch conformity experiments involved subjects who were placed
with a group of confederates who gave different measurements of a line. Asch
wondered about the circumstances under which the subject would capitulate to
the majority. He found that some people did, others were confused, and others
were resistant. The findings were that if the confederates were unanimous,
people conformed; if there were a few dissenters, or even an inconsistent
dissenter, the rate of conformity dropped drastically. The Milgram experiments
seemed to show a lot of conformity. But they can’t even be run again because
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people would know what was going on. Subjects did question the experiment
as it went on, but the experimenters were trained to fend the questions off.
The experiments are all about abnormal situations: settings are
information poor, so that often the only added information is the beliefs of
others; access to other opinions is manipulated; information costs are
manipulated or high, so that only cheap information supports the outcome. So
these are, from the point of view of normal heuristics, abnormal situations.
They are useful only for revealing our normal heuristics. But they also show
that one can create abnormal situations that allow these normal social heuristics
to be used against people. The problem, as indicated in connection with
bilateral asymmetric consilience, is that the heuristics themselves, by definition,
do not detect the abnormality of the situation. And this is particularly
important in relation to notions like consensus, which we know from these
experiments to have powerful effects on people’s belief: assumptions about the
independence of the parties to the consensus are false, and the environment is
information poor.

Expert Knowledge and Democracy
We can think of the problems with which we began, the problem of
expertise in liberal democracy, in terms relative to normal and abnormal
heuristics rather than “truth.” Simple models of democracy assume that people
have interests, knowledge of the basic functions of government and
information on how they are being carried out, and a capacity to assess the
interests and motives of others. They operate to advance their own interests,
and make common cause with those who can articulate interests that coincide
with theirs, or are not in too great a conflict with theirs, or match their vision
of a harmonious, decent society. But the heuristics they employ, according to
various bodies of research, involve getting information from trusted sources,
such as local influentials, rather than making these assessments on their own.
This is a heuristic: trust those who you know to be well-informed, responsible,
and with a stake in the same things you have a stake in.
“Influence,” however, is a crude term, which implies some sort of occult
psychological force. Perhaps, in these cases, it should be understood
epistemically, in the manner of the physician. If the influential says things that
imply things that the hearer knows, it should help strengthen both of their
beliefs. Even the weak epistemic support provided by the fact that the
influential, who is similarly situated, has these beliefs is still epistemic rather
than a matter of occult psychology. Nevertheless the reliance on influentials is a
heuristic with obvious biases. Some of these, under normal circumstances, are
beneficial. It provides an obvious protection against such classic evils of
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democracy as demagoguery: if one is relying along with one’s friends on one’s
local influentials, it is unlikely that waves of political enthusiasm for false
prophets will overwhelm the system. At the same time, it is a heuristic that is
relatively immune to totalitarian ideology: local influentials tend to think for
themselves and not behave in a uniform manner. But it is also true that such a
system is not especially receptive to assertions of expert authority that do not
operate through trusted local influentials.
Of course, all of this is a greatly simplified model even of traditional
democracies. Modern democracies are composed of people with memberships
in a variety of groups, which operate in ways that differ, and have their own
heuristics. Because of the sheer variety of heuristics found in different groups,
the possible combinations of them in a collective procedure are also large. The
problem of designing a decision procedure that produces good results given the
individual heuristics of the participants is daunting. But posing the question in
terms of double heuristics does allow us to give these questions some content.
What if it is claimed that liberal democracy, because of its open discussion,
which fails to adequately defer to scientific consensus, needs to be abolished or
corrected by policing utterances about science in order to save the world by
enacting proper policies on climate change? These are translatable into
questions about the joint operation of individual and collective heuristics, and
pose questions that might be solved by altering collective decision procedures
to produce heuristics with different biases.
We can ask the same kinds of critical questions about the double
heuristics involved in the production of collective expert opinion out of
individual expert heuristics. Does scientific groupthink and grant-driven
bandwagoning make science unreliable as a source of the kinds of facts that
political bodies need to make? What if Ulrich Beck was right to complain that
experts had a conservative epistemic bias which led them to be skeptical about
the evidence for risks, and to systematically under-rate risks, and we have a
system for collective decision-making that defers to experts? (Beck 1995). We
magnify the error producing potential of the system in a specific direction. But
if we have a system in which experts benefit by asserting risks, we have the
opposite result.
In the end it will be clear that there is no such thing as a perfect
heuristic, that each has blind spots or biases. We can also see what the
“normal” situations are in which the heuristics can be said to be the best, and
ask whether the situation we are in is abnormal, and perhaps requires a
differently designed decision procedure which implies a different collective
heuristic. There is no general solution to the problem of whether the situation
in which the heuristic is applied is normal. But that is not the point. We will at
least have a vocabulary in which to ask these questions, and ask them about
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historical cases which are similar, as well as to think about problems of
institutional design. This is a failing of much present discussion of expertise
and liberal democracy, which is concerned instead with the question of whether
expertise is genuine.
And it is a failing of social epistemology to ignore the epistemic
dimension of “the social,” the fact that much of the content of our social
relations with others involves epistemic weightings—indeed, it is hard to see
anything in our social relations that does not involve changes in the weighting
of our own beliefs on the basis of the actions and beliefs of others. Thinking in
terms of double heuristics compels us to think about collective decision
procedures in terms of the same problems of bias, selectivity, and so forth that
characterize the individual knowledge related activities of which collective
activity is composed.
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